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Selecting a Jury in Political Trials*
Jon Van Dyke**
Because juries exercise the controversial power of tailoring static law to the
exigencies of a particular case, it is imperative that the jury constitute a cross-
section of the community. Impaneling a representative jury is even more difficult,
and more critical, in a highly publicized politicul trial. Professor Van Dyke
examines the justifications for the defendant's ue of social science techniques to
scrutinize prospective jurors, and finds that such practices sometimes lead to public
doubt about the impartiality of the jury's verdict. He concludes that although some
defense attorneys may be obliged to survey the attitudes of potential jurors to over-
come biases in the jury selection process, the interests of justice would be better
served if the lists used to impanel jurors were more complete, iffewer excuses and
challenges were allowed, and if (as a result) the resulting jury more accurately
reflected the diversity of the community.
I. INTRODUCTION
MPANELNG AN IMPARTIAL JURY in a trial that has received extensive
media attention presents problems, especially if it is a political trial,
which can be loosely defined as a trial in which political issues, activities, or
personalities are central to the case. Because all the participants approach a
political trial with combative positions, legal institutions and safeguards are
strained and often become vulnerable to manipulation at a time when
strength, stability, and impartiality are most needed. The jury, which is
given the ultimate decisionmaking authority in criminal trials "in order to
prevent oppression by the Government," 1 is taxed when the glare of public-
* Reprinted with permission from JuRY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COM-
MITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS, by Jon M. Van Dyke. Copyright @ 1977, Ballinger
Publishing Company.
** B.A. (1964), Yale University; LL.B. (1967), Harvard University. The author is a Professor
of Law, Hastings College of Law, and is presently a Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Hawaii at Manoa School of Law. He is admitted to the California, District of Columbia, and
Hawaii Bars.
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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ity and clash of ideologies combine in a courtroom confrontation. A rep-
resentative jury is essential in these trials because only a group representing
a broad spectrum of viewpoints can resolve the conflicting evidence in a
manner that truly reflects the community's consensus and because only the
judgment of such a broad-based body will be accepted as legitimate by all
the competing factions. Sensational criminal trials present many of the prob-
lems of political trials.
II. JURY NULLIFICATION
It is usually in political trials that the jury has the opportunity and the
motivation to give its own reading not only of the facts but of the law as it is
to be applied in the particular situation.2 The jury's right to render its deci-
sion according to its convictions (not merely according to the judge's instruc-
tions on the law) was established in the trial of William Penn and William
Mead in 1670. 3 The most famous American case of the jury's use of this
power, which is frequently called "jury nullification," came in the 1735 trial
of John Peter Zenger, who had printed material not authorized by the
British mayor of New York and was accused of "seditious libel." Although
Zenger had clearly violated the law, the jury refused to convict, following
the advice of Zenger's lawyer that they "have the right beyond all dispute to
determine both the law and the facts." 4 This right was well established by
the end of the eighteenth century. In 1794, for instance, John Jay, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, explicitly told a panel of jurors when he was
sitting as a trial judge that they had the right "to determine the law as well
as the fact in controversy."
5
But in the nineteenth century, several prominent judges, apparently not
accepting the idea that a jury can logically be given the right to mitigate the
severity of the law without also having the power to create laws (which
clearly is not the jury's role), refused to tell the jury of its power to nullify, 6
and this refusal was approved by the Supreme Court in 1895. 7 The jury in
fact still has the power to judge the law and the facts-since acquittals by a
jury cannot be appealed on any grounds-but most judges will not inform
jurors of this power. Most often, judges will instruct jurors that they have
2. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REP-
RESENTATIVE PANELS 225-51 (1977).
3. Id. at 5.
4. J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATION OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENCER
78 (1963).
5. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
6. United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815); Un-
ited States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 14,545).
7. Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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the power only to decide the facts, not the law, and must accept the law as
stated by the judge.
The controversy over jury nullification has been renewed in recent
years, 8 and in two states (Indiana and Maryland), judges still specifically
inform jurors of their authority to nullify the law in appropriate cases. 9
Chief Judge David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit believes that jurors should be told that part of
their job is to pass judgment on the equity of applying the law to the
defendant charged in the particular case:
The [jury nullification] doctrine permits the jury to bring to bear
on the criminal process a sense of fairness and particularized jus-
tice. The drafters of legal rules cannot anticipate and take account
of every case where a defendant's conduct is "unlawful" but not
blameworthy, any more than they can draw a bold line to mark the
boundary between an accident and negligence. It is the jury-as
spokesman for the community's sense of values-that must explore
that subtle and elusive boundary .... The very essence of the
jury's function is its role as spokesman for the community con-
science in determining whether or not blame can be imposed.' 0
The Supreme Court has not considered the jury nullification doctrine di-
rectly since their 1895 decision, but the Court has in a number of recent
cases recognized the jury's role as the community's conscience and has rec-
ognized its importance as a law-making body." Perhaps the most telling
clue to the Court's view of the jury's role is contained in the following pas-
sage from a 1968 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart:
[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in
making such a selection [between life and death] is to maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal
system-a link without which the determination of punishment
8. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States.
v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Howe, Juries as
Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HAv. L. REv. 582 (1939); Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The
Prosecution of War Resistors, 57 YALE REV. 481 (1968); Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right
to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972); Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A
Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REv. 488 (1976); Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16
CATH. LAw. 224 (1970).
9. In both Indiana and Maryland, nullification has constitutional underpinnings. IND.
CONST. art. I, § 19, construed in, Holliday v. State, 254 Ind. 85, 257 N.E. 2d 679 (1970);
Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566, 230 N.E. 2d 416, 421 (1967); MD. CONST. art. 15, § 5,
construed in, Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.1 (4th Cir. 1967).
10. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." 12
The necessity of impaneling a jury that fairly represents the community in
cases where the jury may consider the law as well as the facts cannot be
overemphasized.
The parties to political trials clearly realize the importance of jury selec-
tion. The methods of selecting juries for these trials have been almost as
well publicized as the trials themselves. The prosecution's use of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to investigate prospective jurors and the defense's
use of sophisticated psychological and sociological techniques have raised
serious questions about the whole process of jury selection, particularly the
appropriateness of challenges. Prospective jurors have been so studied,
scrutinized, and judged that the juries in some of these trials cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered a randomly selected cross-section of
the community.
This extensive investigation has some justification, to be sure. In well-
publicized cases, the government often has advantages that it does not al-
ways possess in run-of-the-mill cases. One, of course, is publicity and the
feelings it can stir against defendants who hold unpopular views. Two others
are picking the location of the trial and sequestering the jury, which can
affect the jury in ways that render it more likely to favor the government.
III. PUBLICITY
In political trials, both the prosecution and the defense tend to argue in
the court of public opinion before the trial even begins. The public first
learned about the Harrisburg Seven case when F.B.I. director J. Edgar
Hoover, testifying before Congress in November 1970, told his astounded
listeners of a plot by members of the "East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives"
to kidnap Henry Kissinger and hold him hostage until the end of the Viet-
nam War. 13 Hoover's statement made headlines across the country, and
Hoover was put under some pressure to deliver evidence. Shortly there-
after, indictments were issued, once again accompanied by massive pub-
licity.1 4
Some government attempts to mold public opinion backfire, and some-
times the defense can compete successfully with the government in the
12. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
13. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
14. See generally J. NELSON & R. OsTow, THE FBI AND THE BEUUGANs: THE MAKING
OF A CONSPIRACY (1972); W. O'ROURKE, THE HAPiQSBURG 7 AND THE NEW CATHOLIC LEFT
(1972).
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forum of media manipulation. Take the case of the Milwaukee Fourteen. In
September 1968, this group, which earned its sobriquet after its arrest,
raided a Selective Service office in Milwaukee and burned draft files. They
were accused by the state of Wisconsin of burglary, theft, and arson and
were convicted after a trial marked by widespread and often hostile media
coverage. The defendants themselves issued press releases and encouraged
publicity. Subsequent federal charges fied against them were dismissed by
the federal district judge after he had questioned 137 prospective jurors and
determined that they were so prejudiced that an impartial jury could not be
selected (the dismissal was upheld on appeal). 15 Similarly, the 1970 murder
charges against Black Panther leaders Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins in
New Haven were subsequently dismissed after one jury was unable to reach
a unanimous verdict. The judge ruled that an unbiased jury could not be
selected without "superhuman efforts which this Court, the State and these
defendants should not be called upon either to make or to endure." 16 Selec-
tion of the first trial jury had taken four months and had required the
examination of about 1,100 prospective jurors. Then, on the trial's opening
day, J. Edgar Hoover had called the Panthers "the most dangerous group in
America." 17
IV. THE TALAL SrrE
In some political trials, the federal government has used its power to
select trial locations in a way that has seemed to increase rather than reduce
the prejudice to the accused. In cases of national scope, several trial sites
are usually available, and the federal government seems to have tried to
choose locations with populations that are most receptive to the govern-
ment's position.
The trial of Dr. Benjamin Spock, Rev. William Sloan Coffin, and three
other antiwar activists in 1968 could have been brought in New York or
Washington, D.C., but the government chose Boston-where it expected
and obtained a more conservative jury panel and a more conservative judge.
The government was also able to obtain a jury venire containing virtually no
women to try Doctor Spock, who wrote the most popular book on child care
ever published. According to reports, the government somehow persuaded
the jury clerk to slip down to the next name whenever he came across a
woman.' The 1972- trial of the Harrisburg Seven could have been held in
15. See 1970 Wis. L. REV. 209.
16. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
17. See D. FREED, AGONY IN NEW HAVEN: THE TRIAL OF BOBBY SEALE, ERICKA HUG-
GINS AND THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (1973).
18. Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1969).
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Philadelphia, New York, or Rochester-which were all mentioned as loca-
tions of draft boards that had been raided--or in Washington, D.C., where
the defendants allegedly interfered with heating tunnels and planned to kid-
nap Henry Kissinger. But the government chose the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Even within this district, the government had a choice of
three sites: Lewisburg (a college town and site of the federal prison), Scran-
ton (containing a high proportion of Catholics, Democrats, and militant mine
workers), or Harrisburg, the site chosen (with its high proportion of Repub-
licans, a low proportion of Catholics, a high proportion of fundamentalist
religious sects and war-related industries).' 9 For the Pentagon Papers Trial
of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo in 1973, the government chose Los
Angeles-rather than the other possible sites of Boston, New York, or
Washington-probably because of Southern California's heavy concentration
of defense industries. At one point during the selection of the first jury in
July 1972, all 16 prospective jurors picked by lot for preliminary questioning
admitted to a personal or family connection, past or present, with the mili-
tary or a defense industry.20
The defense can request a change of venue, but such requests are not
necessarily granted. In the 1975 Joan Little case, the defense successfully
moved to have the trial held in another county after surveying residents of
the area in which the stabbing took place and finding that virtually everyone
thought the defendant guilty.
V. SEQUESTRATION
Sequestration, like selection of a presumably pro-government trial site,
also has the potential of affecting the jury's makeup. In plain language,
"sequestration" means that the jurors are kept in the custody of the govern-
ment until they are officially released by the judge, a process that can raise
the possibility of prejudice to the defendant and access to the jury by the
government. This procedure is used to insulate the jurors from publicity
about the trial and information about the defendants that is not admissable
into evidence. These objectives are important, but it is also important to
realize that when juries are to be sequestered the number of excuses for
hardship is increased dramatically, and the representativeness of the result-
ing jury is affected.
In all cases, jury service is a hardship because of the loss of time and the
inadequate pay, but in a protracted trial, this hardship is likely to be sub-
stantially more severe, making it that much more difficult to impanel a jury
19. Tavris, Introduction to Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich, & Christie, Recipe for a
Jury, PSYCH. TODAY, May 1973, at 37-38.
20. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1972, § 4, at 12.
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that is representative of the community. Employed persons, particularly
those who work at lower-paying or hourly-paid jobs, are unlikely to be able
to spare the time to serve on a long trial because the compensation for jury
duty is so small. When the jury selection for the first Watergate bugging
trial began in January 1973, 100 of the 250 persons summoned for jury duty
asked to be (and were) summarily excused after Judge John J. Sirica an-
nounced that the jury would be sequestered during the trial.2 1 The same
result occurred when Judge Sirica was impaneling the jury in October 1974
for the major coverup trial.3
Once a panel of jurors who can serve for a long trial is assembled, the
problem of impartiality remains because the jurors are cut off from the out-
side world during sequestration except for the contacts that are authorized
by the government. For the period of the trial, the government censors the
news for the jurors. Jurors may blame the defendant or the prosecutor for
their temporary incarceration or resent being locked up while the defendant
is allowed to be free.
The government may even try to curry favor with the jurors by indulging
their desires. One juror after the 1968 Spock case described how the federal
government took care of him during sequestration: "We had
entertainment-always the best-food always the best, martinis before din-
ner, the government spared no expense to see that our life was as pleasant
as possible. I gained twelve pounds during the trial. We went to the best
restaurants and so forth. '- 23 Another juror was specially escorted by two
marshals during the trial to see his son play rugby. The possibility that
jurors will feel grateful to the government for such attention may conceiva-
bly translate itself into a pro-government bias.
Personality problems that can affect the verdict one way or the other can
arise when jurors are sequestered together for a long period of time. When
the time for deliberation arrives, the jurors may not be speaking as individu-
als with different perspectives, coming from different parts of the commun-
ity, because they may have formed strong relationships with other jurors.
Federal District Judge Ray McNichols wrote a report on sequestration for
the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System in which he raises this
problem:
A more insidious problem may lurk in the background of the prac-
tice of isolating 12 to 18 peers, chosen as a representative cross
section of their society, from their regular routine and habitat for
relatively long periods of time. Nothing suggests to the writer that
any definitive study has been made of the psychological impact on
21. San Fran. Chronicle, Jan. 9, 1973, at 8.
22. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1974, at 22 (city ed.).
23. J. MrrFoRD, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOcK 226 (1973).
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an individual or a group of individuals exposed to this experience.
Only an educated curiosity forms a basis for posing the problem,
and no solution is here proposed. One wonders, nevertheless,
what personality or character changes might occur in the panel
during a seven months' virtual isolation [as occurred in the Man-
son trial] from normal day to day existence.24
Juries sequestered for shorter periods may form into small factions, and
when the deliberations begin, jurors may have teammates who support their
arguments. The jury sequestered for the 1974 Mitchell-Stans trial was in-
vited during the trial by juror Andrew Choa to his office for a private screen-
ing of a movie, and he-the only affluent member of the jury-provided
other small treats during their period of confinement, thus enabling him to
assume a dominant role when the discussion began. 25
Sequestration sometimes does, of course, fulfill its intended purpose of
insulating the jurors from improper influences. The defense in the trial of
the Harrisburg Seven had originally opposed sequestration but concluded
later it helped their side. 26 Post-verdict interviews with seven of the jurors
(who substantially acquitted the Seven) revealed that the pressure from
friends, relatives, the community, and the media-all of whom assumed the
defendants were guilty-might have proved irresistible.
Sequestration is a device used to enable the court to conduct a fair trial
without putting limits on the freedom of the press, and because of these
competing interests, it is sometimes justified. Its use always raises problems,
however, and it should be understood that when a jury is sequestered it is
less likely to be representative and that, despite the fact that sequestration is
intended to eliminate outside influences on the jury, it may exert its own
influences.
VI. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND JURY SELECTION
To overcome the government's common advantage in highly publicized
trials, defense lawyers have been approaching jury selection in a more
sophisticated way, drawing upon the knowledge of psychologists and
sociologists to help choose the ultimate jury panel. It is in the voir dire that
defense lawyers have concentrated a great deal of their attention and ener-
gy, in part as a response to the government's use of the F.B.I. to investigate
prospective jurors, 27 which was done in the Spock and Harrisburg cases.
24. R. McNichols, Preliminary Report on the Sequestration of Jurors (1971) (unpublished
report in Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, Wash., D.C.).
25. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1974, § 4, at 15; id., May 15, 1974, at 41 (city ed.).
26. Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich & Christie, Recipe for a Jury, PsYcH. TODAY, May
1973, at 82-83 [hereinafter cited as Schulman & Shaver].
27. J. MrrFORD, supra note 23, at 99-100, 217. Use by the prosecutor of information on
prospective jurors collected and supplied by the F.B.I. has been upheld on the ground that it
[Vol. 27:609
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Generally, the defendants have no opportunity to obtain this informa-
tion. 28 The methods used by the defense-and by the prosecution when it
employs the F.B.I.-raise serious questions about the integrity of the selec-
tion process. A look at the work by the defense teams in the trials of Angela
Davis, the Harrisburg Seven, John Mitchell and Maurice Stans, and Joan
Little brings into focus the problems of detailed questioning and challeng-
ing.29
Angela Davis's chief defense attorney, Howard Moore, enlisted the serv-
ices of a team of black psychologists to help choose a sympathetic
jury. 30 During the two-and-a-half weeks that the jury was being selected,
the psychologists visited the courtroom each day in teams of two, and during
every break and each evening they would meet with defense attorneys to
share their impressions. Verbal responses to questions and nonverbal indica-
tions of personality and disposition were studied and evaluated. Often the
psychologists suggested a line of questions to be pursued by the lawyers.
When a jury panel was finally selected, Angela Davis rose and stated to the
court: "Although I cannot say that this is a jury of my peers, I can say that,
after much discussion, we have reached the conclusion that the men and
women sitting on the jury will put forth their best efforts to give me a fair
trial." 31 After hearing all the evidence, this jury found her to be not guilty.
The Harrisburg Seven Defense Committee assembled a team of spe-
cialists in 1971 to help understand and evaluate the prospective jurors.3 2
This team included Jay Schulman and Richard Christie, who helped pioneer
the "scientific" method of jury selection in this case and later applied it to
other prominent political trials such as the Camden Twenty-eight, Gaines-
ville Eight, the Wounded Knee defendants, and the Joan Little case. In the
Harrisburg case, a group of sociologists first conducted a general telephone
survey of 1,236 randomly selected registered voters to see if the panel of
does not result in a jury biased against the defendant but rather eliminates bias against the
government. United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1970). The argument that such
data collection will discourage citizens from serving as jurors has been dismissed as "far-fetched
bogies." United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1958). See generally Okun,
Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 CEo. L.J. 839
(1968); Editor's Page, 57 CEO. L.J. 461 (1969).
28. One author reports that the scant case law that has addressed itself to the issue con-
cludes that the defense has no right to information obtained by the F.B.I. for the prosecutor.
Okun, supra note 27, at 854. In the trial of Angela Davis, however, the judge granted a defense
motion that enabled the defense to share the government's information about prospective
jurors. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1972, at 39 (city ed.).
29. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 141-45, 160-66.
30. See generally Robinson, How Psychology Helped Free Angela, EBONY, Feb. 1973, at 44.
31. N.Y. Times, March 15, 1972, at 39 (city ed.).
32. The information in this section is taken from a complete and thorough account of the
Harrisburg jury matter by Schulman & Shaver, supra note 26, at 39.
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prospective jurors was in fact representative of the voters in the area. Inter-
viewers requested data on age, sex, education, race, and occupation from
the random sample. Partly on the basis of evidence thus obtained, which
indicated that the existing panel did not conform to the random-sample
statistics, the trial judge ordered a new jury panel selected. The researchers
then conducted a series of face-to-face interviews designed to elicit more
personal information. Forty-five volunteers were quickly trained to speak to
252 people selected at random from the earlier group of 1,236, and they
asked about which newspapers or magazines the interviewees read, which
radio and television programs they watched, their knowledge of defendants
and the trial, who they considered "the greatest Americans" of the last fif-
teen years, their trust in government, their children, religious preferences,
hobbies and organizational memberships, their views on antiwar activities
and the use of force by police to maintain order, the legitimacy of support-
ing the government even when one believes that the government is wrong,
and whether a person brought to trial is usually guilty.
After the interviewing process was completed, the social scientists as-
sembled the data and concluded that religion was the key factor in the at-
titudinal scheme of those interviewed. Certain religious affiliations-
Episcopalian, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Fundamentalist sects-were
found to be strongly opposed to the ideological position of the defendants.
Catholics, Brethren, and Lutherans were deemed favorable. Another star-
tling conclusion was that, although education and contact with metropolitan
news media is usually equated with liberalism, quite the opposite was the
case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The liberals among the well-
educated apparently leave the Harrisburg area, and those college-educated
persons who stay become business and civic leaders and are usually con-
servative Republicans. The data, in fact, revealed that most people in the
Harrisburg area are quite conservative. 33 And the researchers felt that at
least four out of every five persons who would qualify as jurors would be
opposed to the defendants. The judge's decision to allow counsel to conduct
its own voir dire and frame its own questions to the jurors was therefore
most beneficial to the defense.
After three weeks, the panel of 465 prospective jurors was narrowed
down by excuses and challenges for cause to 46. Federal District Judge R.
Dixon Herman used the struck-jury system for peremptory challenges,
whereby the defense would exercise its 28 peremptories and the prosecution
33. Eighty percent trusted the government, compared to the national level of 40-50%; 87%
felt that the right to private property is sacred; only 37% had heard of Rev. Philip Berrigan, the
most well-known of the defendants; 81% approved police violence to maintain order; 65%
thought that government should be supported even when it was wrong.
[Vol. 27:609
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would use its 6 to pare the 46 down to a jury of 12. The defense strategy
was thus to rate these remaining 46 prospective jurors. A scale ranging from
1 (highly favorable juror) to 5 (highly undesirable) was set up, and as much
information as possible about each juror was assembled. The two characteris-
tics that seemed especially important to the defense point of view in addi-
tion to religion were opposition to authority and a social style that was more
"maternalistic"-caring and loving-than "paternalistic"-stern and discipli-
nary. And at least one juror had to be Catholic in order to inhibit any anti-
Catholic sentiments. Using these standards, the defense rated eight of the
46 prospects as #1, five as #2, fifteen as #3, and eighteen as #4 or #5. The
prosecutor, apparently having made similar judgments about some of the
jurors, used his six peremptory challenges against six of the #1's. 34 The
defense thus had to decide which five jurors should be chosen from category
3 in addition to the seven it would save from groups 1 and 2.
A major concern was how the members of the jury would relate to each
other as a group. How independent would individual jurors be in arriving at
their own decisions, and to what extent would they stand firm once they had
made up their minds? Responses elicited during the voir dire and informa-
tion gathered from members of the community furnished some guide in
answering these questions, but often the data were conflicting, and hard
choices had to be made. The defense felt that a group of women would stick
together during the long sequestration, and they hoped that at least one
would have a negative reaction to Boyd Douglas, the prosecution's chief
witness, who had proposed marriage to several young college students to get
information from them. This negative reaction, they thought, might then be
passed along to the other women in the subgroup.
The proof of the effectiveness of this mode of jury selection can only be
determined after the deliberations are concluded and the verdict is re-
corded. In this case, it was 10-2 for acquittal on the main charge of conspi-
racy. Interestingly enough, the only two jurors who voted against acquittal
came from the #2 category, not #3. 3 5 While the jury was deliberating, the
defense staff interviewed again 83 people from the original 252 people ran-
domly selected and previously contacted. Of the 61 people who had been
following the trial and were willing to express themselves on the guilt or
innocence of the defendants, the overwhelming majority thought the
defendants were guilty as charged. The jury, on the other hand, voted 10-2
34. The government used the F.B.I. to check jurors' backgrounds, which meant that they
also had detailed information with which to decide whom to challenge.
35. One of these jurors had not been questioned fully by the defense lawyers because they
felt the juror might reveal information to the prosecutor that would encourage him to challenge
her. The other had been rated #2 because he gave pro-defense answers, although the social
predictors were unfavorable. The defense wondered later if he had told the truth at voir dire.
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for acquittal on the conspiracy charge. This result tends to confirm the "suc-
cess" of the defense's methods in selecting a sympathetic jury. Looking for
factors that led to the guilty or innocent judgment, the defense found that
37 percent of the interviewed women thought the defendants were guilty on
all or most counts, whereas 57 percent of the men made this same judg-
ment. (The jury consisted of nine women, three men.) The most accurate
predictors, however, were education and religion; exposure to the media
also contributed to an antidefense attitude.
In the 1974 New York City trial of John Mitchell and Maurice Stans on
charges of conspiracy and perjury, the defense, also using social science
techniques, had the opportunity to mold the jury in much the same way that
the Harrisburg defense shaped their jury. Once again, the judge gave the
defense a substantial advantage in the number of peremptory challenges: 20
for the defense and only 8 for the prosecution. Judge Lee Gagliardi (a
Nixon appointee) decided on these figures because he felt the substantial
pretrial publicity had put the defendants at a disadvantage .36 Judge Gag-
liardi made two other decisions that may have helped the defendants. He
eliminated for cause many of the better educated potential jurors because
of their possible prejudice, 37 and he excused all persons who indicated
that they would suffer a severe hardship by being sequestered for many
weeks, 38  thus eliminating the most economically precarious jurors-and
many nonwhites-who might differ politically with Stans and Mitchell.
The defendants hired Marty Herbst, a communications consultant, to as-
sist in the jury selection, and he recommended that they seek blue-collar
jurors, Roman Catholic if possible, who had not gone to college, earned
between $8,000 and $10,000 and read the New York Daily News rather than
the New York Times or New York Post. To be avoided were Jews and what
Herbst called "limousine liberals." "We wanted," he said later, "people who
were home established, to the right, more concerned with inflation than
Watergate," and who might somehow associate John Mitchell with John
Wayne. 3 9 At least one person selected to be a juror had never heard of
either of the defendants before the trial began.
When the trial ended and the jurors were sent to the jury room for
deliberations, they sat for 20 minutes without saying anything. Finally, they
asked for copies of the indictment and began taking preliminary votes, which
indicated that a majority favored a guilty verdict. But after much discussion,
36. Etzioni, Scientific Jury-Stacking Puts Judicial System on Trial, Boston Globe, June 23,
1974, § A, at 3.
37. Zeisel, Mitchell-Stans Judged, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1974, § 4, at 15.
38. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 14 (city ed.).
39. Arnold, How Mitchell-Stans Jury Reached Acquittal Verdict, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974,
at 41 (city ed.).
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the jury seems to have become dominated by Andrew Choa, an alternate
who joined the jury when a vacancy developed and the one juror who did
not fit all the criteria layed down by Herbst: he had gone to college (and the
Harvard Business School) and was vice-president of the First National City
Bank. He not only knew who the defendants were but had in fact contri-
buted to Richard Nixon's presidential campaign. Juror Choa was able to di-
rect the rest of the jury's attention to weaknesses in the prosecution's case
and was instrumental in producing the final result: a unanimous verdict for
acquittal on all counts.40 The scenario for acquittal was thus somewhat un-
predictable, but certainly some of the defense tactics paid off.
Social science methods of selection were again used with sophistication in
the trial of Joan Little in 1975, where the defense's first step, as in the
Harrisburg case, was to survey the county in which the alleged crime took
place to gauge public feeling about the case. After finding that most people
in the county thought the defendant guilty and, furthermore, that the jury
pool substantially underrepresented blacks, women, and young people, they
successfully moved for a change of venue. In the new location (Raleigh, in
Wake County), the team interviewed almost a thousand residents to obtain
their attitudes about police, blacks, rape, and other issues considered impor-
tant to the trial, and to find out their income, occupation, and other
socioeconomic data. After questioning the jury pool in the same way, they
found the same proffle of responses, meaning that, if their methods were
correct, the jury wheel was indeed representative. After charting (with a
computer) the correlation between age, education, and other factors with
attitudes, they came up with certain standards by which to identify favorable
and unfavorable jurors, 4 ' and discovered that what people read was the most
important measure of their views. The jury finally assembled was half black
and half white 42 and acquitted the defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION
Methods such as these may indeed help obtain a jury that acquits a
defendant, but possibly at the cost of diminishing respect for the judicial
system. Panels that seem to have been manipulated by one side or the other
(or both) will not fulfill their purpose of conveying legitimacy to the com-
munity. Even people who believe a defendant innocent may wonder at the
"justice" being rendered by an apparently hand-picked jury.
40. Arnold, How Mitchell-Stans Jury Reached Acquittal Vote, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, at
1, col. 6.
41. Tivnan, Jury by Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1975, (Magazine), at 30.
42. There were originally seven white and five black jurors, but one white juror fell ill and
was replaced by a black.
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Obtaining an impartial jury is admittedly difficult in well-publicized
cases, as Chief Justice John Marshall recognized in the trial of Aaron Burr in
1807.4 3 The chance that jurors will have formed an opinion on the case is
much greater than in other cases. Because of that difficulty, and the impor-
tance of impaneling a jury that embodies the community's conscience in
such sensitive cases, special care must be taken in jury selection. The ques-
tion must be asked in these trials, as in the challenge process as a whole,
how much and what kind of questioning is really necessary to obtain an
impartial jury. There are other steps that can be taken in highly publicized
trials that may make extensive questioning and challenges unnecessary and
help preserve the random character of the panel.
Judges should be aware of actions that might be taken by the govern-
ment to increase rather than reduce bias in the jury, and resist them. They
should work to ensure that a representative jury is impaneled by special
attention to actions that can distort the jury's capacity to speak for the com-
munity. Exhaustive questioning may in fact be necessary in cases that are
nationally publicized. But in most cases, better solutions can be found to
reduce the potential bias. One is to change the site of the trial to a location
with an ethnic population similar to the area in which the crime allegedly
occurred, and with a fair number of persons of the defendant's ethnic
background-thus replicating the community's character in a less emotional
atmosphere."4 Another is to make sure that selection procedures are truly
random by insisting that the list of prospective jurors is as complete as is
humanly possible, resisting all requests for excuses, limiting challenges for
cause to cases of clear and unmistakable prejudice, and limiting peremptory
challenges to no more than three, or at most five. The body thus impaneled
should be truly representative. It will certainly be diverse and may take
longer to deliberate, but its verdict-because it will be the expression of a
consensus of the community's view-is more likely to be accepted by all
factions as impartial and legitimate.
43. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693); see J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 142-43, 160.
44. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963).
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